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Abstract
One of the main challenges of this decade in the antitrust arena is the creation of some form
of cooperative international antitrust regime. The potential benefit of increased international trade
and cooperative competition policies to all countries involved are enormous. This Article analyzes
this issue from the point of view of small and developing jurisdictions. Part I sets the stage by
suggesting a typology of the challenges created by globalization. Part II analyzes the current international antitrust regime from a wider perspective that incorporates the enforcement challenges
faced by small and developing jurisdictions. Part III builds upon these findings and analyzes their
implications for international trust.
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ANTITRUST IN A GLOBALIZED ECONOMY: THE
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BY SMALL AND DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS
Michal S. Gal*
INTRODUCTION
While, in the past, antitrust issues were largely contained
within national borders, justifying doctrines based on the
assumption that the law stops at a nation's shore, antitrust issues
have become increasingly international.' Countries face an
increasing prospect that their economies will be harmed by
anticompetitive conduct that takes place, in whole or in part, in
another jurisdiction. Moreover, every country has an interest in
the choices that other countries make about the adoption and
enforcement of their competition laws in cases with cross-border
effects. 2 To paraphrase a well-known quote, no country is an
island, entire of itself. 3 Accordingly, one of the main challenges
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Daniel Sokol, Michael Trebilcock, Spencer Weber Waller, and Chuck Webb for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts, Russell Damtoft, Barbara Lee, Russell Pittman,
and David Tadmor for most helpful discussions, Mor Bakhoum, Boaz Golan, Asher
Goshen, Ariel Katz, Ilan Steiner, and the competition authorities of the jurisdictions
referred to in this Article for most helpful information, Idan Hatzav, Stephen Dobson,
Natalie Gantman, and Dikla Tzarfati for research assistance, and the editors of the
Fordham InternationalLaw Journalfor their excellent editorial work. Finally, I thank the
Israeli Science Foundation for generous financial support. All errors and omissions
remain the author's.
1. See generally INT'L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTICE,
FINAL REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR

ANTITRUST (2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm.
2. For an analysis of such effects, see, for example, Michal S. Gal & Jorge Padilla,
The Follower Effect, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2010).
3. Part of a sermon by the seventeenth century English author and clergyman John
Donne. SeeJOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS VPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS AND SEVERALL STEPS
IN MY SICKNESSE MEDITATION XVII at 162 (British Libr. 1638).
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of this decade in the antitrust arena is the creation of some form
of a cooperative international antitrust regime.
The potential benefits of increased international trade and
cooperative competition policies to all countries involved are
enormous. Yet to determine whether such benefits could be
realized, and whether some countries are likely to benefit more
than others, one needs to analyze the array of tools at each
country's disposal to deal with antitrust issues arising from
globalized trade as well as the current and foreseeable steps
4
towards cooperation.
This Article analyzes this issue from the point of view of
small and developing jurisdictions. 5 While much has been written
on international antitrust, not much scholarship has focused on
the unique antitrust enforcement challenges facing these
jurisdictions in a globalized world, their causes, or how these
challenges shape coordination efforts. 6 Moreover, while scholars
often assume low enforcement levels on international antitrust
issues in such jurisdictions, 7 this assumption was never proven.

4. For the seminal works on this issue see Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust and
InternationalRegulatory Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1142 (2001) [hereinafter Guzman,
Federalism];Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501
(1998) [hereinafter Guzman, International Antitrust]. See also Edward M. Graham,
Economic Considerationsin Merger Review, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WH-AT FUTURE FOR

TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 57 (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds., 2001); Daniel Sokol,
Monopolies Without Borders, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 37 (2007). These models, however, do
not account for all the intricacies of international antitrust that this Article identifies.
5. A small jurisdiction is defined as an independent, sovereign jurisdiction with a
small population size. It differs from a "small economy" which is defined as "an
independent, sovereign jurisdiction that can support only a limited number of firms in
most of its industries" and in which population dispersion and openness to trade also
affect the definition. See MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET

ECONOMIES 13-45 (2003). The focus of this Article is on population size since it is the
main driver of the extent of local demand, which is relevant to the current analysis. The
definition also includes countries that, although autonomous, have constitutional ties to
other jurisdictions (such as the Faroe Islands,Jersey, and Greenland). See Charles Webb,
Multum in Parvo: Competition Law in Small Economies Compared, 10JERSEY L. REV. 351, 352
(2006). As defined by the World Bank, developing economies include low and middleincome jurisdictions with gross national income per capita of less than US$9,206. See
World
Bank,
Country
Classification,
http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0
(definition used up through 2008). Many developing countries are also small, and vice
versa.
6. For some exceptions, see Guzman, Federalism, supra note 4; Guzman,
InternationalAntitrust, supra note 4; Sokol, supranote 4.
7. See, e.g., Guzman, Federalism, supra note 4; Guzman, InternationalAntitrust, supra
note 4; Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels and
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This Article takes on this challenge. The analysis is both
theoretical and empirical. It reports on a unique dataset that is
comprised of case studies of forty-eight jurisdictions.8 It is also
based on the analysis of the actions and dynamics of the
International Competition Network ("ICN"), 9 which currently
epitomizes international efforts to cooperate on cross-border
antitrust issues. 10 As international cooperation on antitrust has
already begun to take shape, this Article is timely.
As the Article shows, even when they possess the legal tools
to tackle international antitrust issues, small jurisdictions and
developing economies often suffer from serious practical and
motivational deficiencies. Most importantly, they frequently
cannot create a credible threat to enforce their laws against large,
multinational firms that engage in anticompetitive conduct that
harms their economy. Moreover, they also often have limited
resources
and
incentives
to
deal with
international
anticompetitive conduct. As a result, despite the potentially
severe effects of anticompetitive conduct on their markets, these
jurisdictions are habitually passive bearers of the effects of
international anticompetitive conduct rather than proactive
confronters of it. Consequently, their interests are routinely
overlooked both by international firms and by other jurisdictions.
Obviously, such enforcement and behavioral patterns have
significant, negative effects on their domestic welfare.

Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implicationsfor Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 801 (2004).
8. The study involves more than half of the jurisdictions with operational antitrust
regimes in the relevant period. ProfessorJohn Connor has created an important dataset
on international cartels. SeeJohn Connor & Gustav Helmers, Statistics on Modern Private
International Cartels (Purdue Univ. Dept. of Agric. Econ., Working Paper #06-11, 2006),
available at http://purl.umn.edu/28650. The dataset reported in this Article differs in
three important respects: (1) it includes not only cartels, but also cases of abuse and
merger review; (2) it provides country-specific information rather than aggregated
regional data; and (3) it allows one to analyze the enforcement decisions of different
jurisdictions with regard to cartels that affect other jurisdictions as well, since cartels are
defined as those which affect more than one jurisdiction rather than cartels which
involve at least one foreign-owned firm.
9. See
generally
Int'l
Competition
Network
[ICN]:
Home,
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). The author
has served as a nongovernmental advisor to the International Competition Network
("ICN") since its inception.
10. See Eleanor M. Fox, Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network, 43
INT'L LAW. 151 (2009).
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These findings also have important implications for
cooperative international antitrust. As elaborated below, most
current cooperative efforts are unlikely to provide an efficient
solution to the enforcement challenges of small and developing
jurisdictions. To be sure, jurisdictional overlap in international
antitrust issues has created dependencies among different
countries, which, in turn, enhances the need for coordinating
antitrust policies between jurisdictions based on negotiation and
persuasion rather than hierarchical mechanisms of control. Yet
due to their limited bargaining power resulting from, inter alia,
the enforcement patterns identified in this Article, a negotiated
outcome is unlikely to grant small and developing jurisdictions a
piece of the total welfare pie that is proportional to their size or
their contribution to global welfare. Nor is it likely to solve many
of the global welfare issues that arise from existing enforcement
patterns.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I sets the stage by
suggesting a typology of the challenges created by globalization.
This Part also focuses on the legal tools at the disposal of
antitrust authorities. Part II analyzes the current international
antitrust regime from a wider perspective that incorporates the
enforcement challenges faced by small and by developing
jurisdictions. Part III builds upon these findings and analyzes
their implications for international antitrust. It also suggests
some tools that small and developing jurisdictions can employ in
order to play a more effective role in the international antitrust
arena.
It is noteworthy that although this Article focuses on
antitrust, some of its conclusions have implications that go well
beyond this field of law. In fact, the analysis of the unique
enforcement challenges faced by small and developing
jurisdictions in a predominantly unilateral enforcement regime,
and the implications that these challenges have for the creation
of an international regime, may well carry over to other legal
fields in which globalization creates domestic issues.
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ANTITRUST INA GLOBALIZED ECONOMY
CURRENT ANTITRUST REGIME IN A GLOBALIZED
ECONOMY
A.

The Challenges of Globalization

This Part sets the stage for the analysis of the tools employed
to tackle antitrust issues arising from the globalization of trade. It
does so by suggesting a typology of anticompetitive conduct with
international dimensions. 1
Most antitrust issues are domestic in nature and affect only,
or predominantly, domestic welfare. For example, a cartel among
domestic firms in an industry in which imports and exports play a
limited role, or a merger among such firms, raises no issues for
international antitrust. Such a situation should continue to be
dealt with by the relevant domestic antitrust enforcement
agencies.
Yet, at an increasing rate, antitrust issues contain an
12
international dimension and affect more than one jurisdiction.
Such antitrust issues can be divided into four broad categories in
13
accordance with the location of their welfare effects.
In the first type of cases, the conduct of market players
enhances or has a neutral effect on the welfare of all the
jurisdictions in which they trade. That will be the case, for
example, should the merging firms face strong competition in all
markets in which they trade. In the second type of cases, the
11. This typology was first suggested in the merger context in GAL, supra note 5, at
241. A formalization of a similar approach can be found in Abigail Tay & Gerald
Willmann, Why (No) Global Competition Policy Is a Tough Choice, 45 Q. REV. OF ECON. & FIN.
312 (2005).
12. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, Panel II: International Law and Federalism: What is the
Reach of Regulation? Externalities in Open Economy Antitrust and Their Implications for
International Competition Policy, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 93 (1999). A study
conducted by Connor and Helmers estimated that global cartels created more than half
of the harm created by all cartels discovered anywhere around the world from 1990 to
2005; their total overcharge was more than US$250 billion. See Connor & Helmers, supra
note 8, at 3. International cartels are generally larger, longer lasting, and more injurious
than domestic cartels. Id.
13. Welfare is used in this Article in a wide sense to include both static and
dynamic welfare considerations. The categories identified below are based on a simple
model that is meant to identify and categorize the effects of the conduct of international
market players on different jurisdictions. Real life, of course, offers more complicated
situations. However, the model can easily be extended to capture them. For example,
the model can be extended to more than two countries by adding up those jurisdictions
with aligned interests.
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conduct of international market players reduces the welfare of all
the jurisdictions in which they trade. To illustrate, the "Vitamins"
cartel negatively affected all the countries in which vitamins were
sold. 14 If the relevant market is truly global, conduct will
generally fall within one of these two categories.
The third type of case creates mixed effects: the conduct
creates positive or neutral welfare effects on the domestic
jurisdiction (possibly on some foreign jurisdictions also) and
negative welfare effects on one or more foreign jurisdictions. 15
This may occur, for example, when parties to ajoint venture face
strong competition in some markets, but face limited
competition in others due to high entry barriers. This category
also includes export cartels and cases in which a domestic firm
abuses its power in foreign markets. 16 To concretize this type of
cases, consider European and U.S. food producers merger of
Unilever and Best Foods. The European Union ("EU") and the
United States approved the merger, since it did not raise
anticompetitive concerns in their markets. 17 Yet it substantially

14. For an analysis of the self-nicknamed 'Vitamins, Inc." cartel see, for example,
John M. Connor, The Great Global Vitamins Conspiracy, 1989-1999, in GLOBAL PRICE
FIXING (Heidelberg: Springer Verlag 2008) [hereinafter Connor, Vitamins]. The study
estimates that the international vitamins cartel affected over US$34 billion of commerce,
measured by the sales revenues derived from the products during the price-fixing
period. For more information on the impact of international cartels see, for example,
Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Report On The NatureAnd Impact of Hard
Core Cartels and Sanctions Against Cartels Under National Competition Laws (2002), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/20/2081831.pdf.
15. For an economic exposition of this possibility, seeJanusz A. Ordover & Alan 0.
Sykes, The Antitrust Guidelinesfor InternationalOperations:An Economic Critique, in ANNUAL
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: NORTH AMERICAN AND
COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST AND TRADE LAWS 4-1 (Barry Hawk ed., 1988). Of course,

when firms are global, it might be difficult to differentiate their domestic and foreign
markets. In such instances, type three and type four cases merge.
16. No case can affect only foreign welfare if total welfare considerations are taken
into account. The reason is quite simple: even a pure export cartel, which does not
affect consumer welfare in the jurisdiction from which the cartelized firms operate, has
some effects on producer surplus in the exporting country. For example, raising the
profits of the exporting firm would raise the taxes it pays. This is demonstrated by the
strong resistance of many exporting jurisdictions to regulate the conduct of their export
cartels.
17. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.1990, 2000 O.J. C 311/6 [hereinafter
Unilever-Best Foods] (approval of European Union); see also Commission Press Release,
IP/00/1076 (Sept. 29, 2000). The merger went forward under U.S. antitrust law because
the statutory review period after filing notice with the Federal Trade Commission
elapsed without issue. See Press Release, Unilever, Unilever/Bestfoods Merger H-S-R
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lessened competition in some Israeli markets, given that each of
the merging entities had previously merged with a dominant
player in some Israeli food market. 8
The fourth type is characterized by opposite mixed effects: it
creates negative welfare effects in the domestic jurisdiction
(possibly on some additional jurisdictions as well) and positive
effects in one or more foreign jurisdictions. This may be the case
when high trade barriers in the home jurisdiction prevent the
entry of foreign firms that compete effectively with a domestic
one in other markets.
Figure 1 represents the four cases visually, in a two-country
setting, which can be extended to a multi-country one. 19 The
horizontal axis represents the welfare effects on Jurisdiction A,
while the vertical axis represents the welfare effects on
Jurisdiction B. Accordingly, the right-slanted area represents the
cases that are harmful to the Jurisdiction A, while the left-slanted
area represents the cases that are harmful to the Jurisdiction B.
As Figure 1 clearly indicates, the first two types are easy
cases, in the sense that the interests of all countries involved are
aligned. The decision of Jurisdiction A will generally coincide
with the interest of Jurisdiction B. Yet even in these cases, issues
of coordination and cooperation arise. For one, cooperation may
be necessary for gathering the information needed to prosecute
anticompetitive conduct, evaluating its effects, or enforcing
remedies effectively.20 Coordination is also needed if antitrust
regulation requires ex ante clearance of a transaction, as for
mergers. If a merger must be approved by multiple agencies and
Review Period Expires (Sept. 11, 2000), available at http://www.unilever.com/
mediacentre/pressreleases/2000/bestl 2.aspx.
18. See Dir. of Isr. Competition Auth., Conditioned Approval of the Merger
between Tozeret Mazon Israelit Baam and Unilever N.V., case M/4006 (Sept. 27, 2000),
available at http://archive.antitrust.gov.il/ANTItem.aspx?ID=1888
(previous merger
involving Unilever). The previous merger between Bestfoods and another Israeli firm
did not require approval of the Israeli Antitrust Authority under Israeli law because only
one firm held domestic presence. See Restrictive Trade Practices Law §§ 1, 17, 57481988, 42 LSI 135, 137, 141 (1987-88) (Isr.).
19. The graph is adapted from Tay & Willmann, supra note 11, at 319.
20. The U.S. antitrust case against General Electric and other international
companies failed because the enforcement agencies were not able to secure evidence
from abroad. See EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1012 (2007); Spencer Weber Waller, Anticartel Cooperation, in ANTITRUST
GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSLATLANTIc COOPERATION? 98, 98 (Simon J.
Evenett et al. eds., 2000).
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Figure 1. The typology of international anticompetitive conduct
the process is lengthy, costly, or unpredictable, the transaction
costs of such a multijurisdictional review might prevent an
otherwise welfare-enhancing merger from taking place, even if it
would have been approved by all.2 1 Ironically, such governmental
barriers to trade are a direct result of the attempt to effectively
regulate private barriers.
Additional cooperation issues arise with regard to the effects
that limited international enforcement might have on the
incentives of firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct. As will
21. See, e.g., Notification and Procedures Subgroup, ICN, Report on the Costs and
Burdens
of
Multijurisdictional Merger
Review
4-9
(2004),
available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/
conferenceIst-naples_2002/costburd.pdf; Bus. & Indus. Advisory Comm. to the OECD
& Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Recommended Framework for Best Practices in International
Merger Control Procedures 2 (2001), available at http://www.biac.org/statements/comp/
BIAC-ICCMergerPaper.pdf; William J. Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, A Comment on the
Estimated Costs of Multi-JurisdictionalMerger Reviews, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Sept. 2003,
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/03/09/comment.pdf.
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be elaborated below, currently a limited number of jurisdictions
bring international cartels to trial. Yet the sanctions imposed by
the handful of jurisdictions on cartel members might not be
sufficient to deter future international cartels, as the fines,
private damages, and even jail time imposed by them are
generally based on the harm to their domestic consumers and
firms. 22 Cartel members may thus still find it profitable to engage
in international anticompetitive activity .so long as the benefits
from cartelization are larger than the fines and damages they
must incur in the few jurisdictions that enforce their laws against
them.
The need for coordination also arises from the fact that
sanctions against international cartels are not synchronized. This
fact reduces the incentives of cartelists to report their cartels
through leniency programs, since once the cartel is discovered
the party that reported the cartel might still be subject to
sanctions in other jurisdictions in which it does not enjoy
leniency. In fact, this situation strengthens international cartels
relative to domestic ones, as cheating on them by way of
reporting produces lower rewards. 23 It is thus important to devise
24
ways to solve these incentive problems.
The third and fourth types of extraterritorial cases raise even
more difficult issues for cooperation as different jurisdictions
25
may reach conflicting decisions and have divergent interests.
For example, if the firms of one jurisdiction have monopoly
power in world markets, that jurisdiction might have limited
incentives to stop their anticompetitive activity, thereby
increasing national wealth at the expense of foreigners. A good

22. Such arguments were recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as early as 1978.
See Pfizer v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978); see also OECD, Hard Core Cartels-Recent
Progress and Challenges Ahead 38 (2000); Dennis W. Carlton, Using Economics to Improve
Antitrust Policy, 2004 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 283, 307 (2004). These arguments were also
argued before the Supreme Court in Empagran. See Brief for Economists Joseph E.
Stiglitz & Peter R. Orszag as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, F. Hoffmann-La
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724); Brief for Certain
Professors of Economics as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Empagran, 542 U.S.
155 (No. 03-724).
23. See SimonJ. Evenett et al., InternationalCartelEnforcement: Lessonsfrom the 1990s,
24 WORLD ECON. 1221, 1221 (2001).
24. Of course, the fact that only a handful of jurisdictions bring international
cartels to trial reduces this incentive problem.
25. See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 12, at 92.
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illustration involves the reluctance of the South African
government to place limitations on the diamond cartel that
operated from within its borders. Moreover, as Figure 1 indicates,
such cases may create over-enforcement relative to a worldwide
total welfare standard, if the negative welfare effects on all
countries affected are smaller than their positive welfare effects.2 6
With this mapping of international antitrust issues, let us
now analyze the legal tools that small and developing
jurisdictions posses to deal with antitrust issues that fall into each
of the four categories identified, as well as the practical obstacles
to their application.
B.

The CurrentInternationalAntitrust Regime: Legal Tools

The current international antitrust system is largely based
on unilateral enforcement whereby each jurisdiction deals, on its
own, with antitrust issues surfacing at its borders.2 7 As elaborated
in the next section, the unilateral enforcement regime is also the
main source of the enforcement problems of small and of
developing jurisdictions.
Efforts to increase cooperation and coordination of antitrust
enforcement also take place at the international level. Current
attempts focus mainly on the ICN. The ICN is a voluntary body,
comprised of almost all the competition authorities in the world,
and also non-governmental advisors, for the enhancement of
28
international cooperation and the reduction of trade barriers.
It operates as a mechanism for soft harmonization by creating
guiding principles and best practices agreed upon by all
members rather than binding agreements. Thus, it holds little
promise for solving most type 3 and 4 issues. Most importantly for
this Article, as will be elaborated below, it does not solve many of
the enforcement challenges faced by small or developing
jurisdictions.

26. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 20, at 1012-13; Guzman, International
Antitrust, supra note 4, at 1524; Tay & Willmann, supra note 11, at 319.
27. Many jurisdictions adopt doctrines that allow them to apply their laws
extraterritorially to conduct that significantly and directly affects their markets. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 166-71 (5th ed.

2001).
28. See ICN: Home, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org
Nov. 2, 2009).

(last visited
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Additional international bodies also take actions which are
designed to motivate solutions to international antitrust
problems and to enhance unilateral enforcement. The
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD"), for example, publishes recommendations for
effective action against hard-core cartels and often reviews the
suitability of sanctions imposed by jurisdictions in order to deter
international cartels. 29 It also regularly publishes country-specific
reports on antitrust enforcement and organizes round-table
discussions on antitrust issues, designed to create better antitrust
enforcement.3 0
Likewise, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD") undertakes projects designed to
increase enforcement and cooperation. 3 For example, it
promotes the creation of regional agreements on antitrust
enforcement among developing jurisdictions. 32 Additional
international organizations, including the World Bank, also
sometimes engage in technical assistance programs on
competition issues. 33 Yet these actions, while commendable, are
29. See, e.g., Competition Comm., OECD, Hard Core Cartels: Third Report On The
Implementation of the
1998
Council Recommendation (2005),
available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/1/35863307.pdf;
Competition Comm., OECD,
Report On the Nature and Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions Against Cartels Under
National Competition Laws, OECD Doc. DAFFE/COMP(2002)7 (2002), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/20/2081831.pdf;
OECD, Recommendation of the
Council ConcerningEffective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, OECD Doc. C(98)35/FINAL
(1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2350130.pdf.
30. See, e.g., Jay C. Shaffer, OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Ukraine: An OECD
Peer Review, OECD Doc. 00(2008)1N/3P1 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/44/26/41165857.pdf; Comm. on Consumer Policy, OECD, Roundtable on
Demand-Side Economics for Consumer Policy: Summary Report, OECD
Doc.
DSTI/CP (2006) 3/FINAL
(2006),
http://wvww.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/46/
36581073.pdf. For a sampling of the OECD's publications, see OECD, Publications &
Documents, http://www.oecd.org/publications (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
31. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Main Activities,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3359&lang=I (last visited Nov.
2,2009).
32. For a U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. ("UNCTAD") study of the effects of
regional agreements on antitrust enforcement, see Competition Provisions in Regional
Agreements:
How
to
Assure
Development
Gains,
U.N.
Doc.
No.
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/1 (Phillipe Brusick et al. eds., 2005).
33. See, e.g., Shyam Khemani, Senior Competition Advisor, World Bank, Comments
at the Conference on Charting the Future Course of International Technical Assistance
144 (Feb. 6, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
workshops/techassist2008/236894.pdf).
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relatively limited in their effect on solving international antitrust
problems. This is because in most cases unilateral action still
remains the main tool for enforcement and the resulting
cooperation is limited in the ways suggested in this section. The
World Trade Organization ("WTO") has considered the
inclusion of some antitrust prohibitions in its provisions.3 4
However, this option is currently off the table.-5
III. THE ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES OF SMALL AND OF
DEVELOPINGJURISDICTIONS
How do small and developing jurisdictions deal with
antitrust cases with an international dimension that negatively
affect their jurisdictions and what drives their enforcement
patterns? This is the focus of this Part.
Before practical obstacles are analyzed, let us first say a few
words with regard to the legal tools at the disposal of such
jurisdictions. The current international antitrust system is largely
based on unilateral enforcement and national vision whereby
each jurisdiction deals, on its own, with antitrust issues surfacing
at its borders through the lens of the effect the conduct will have
on its own welfare. 36 The unilateral approach is based on the
assumption that extraterritorial conduct that significantly affects
one's domestic market can generally be addressed at the national
level through national antitrust laws. As this section shows, this
proposition does not hold true for small or developing
economies, as they face severe challenges to effective
prosecution.
These regimes are sometimes combined with bilateral and
multilateral cooperation agreements. Such agreements attempt
to solve, at least to some degree, issues of mutual concern that
34. See World Trade Org. [WTO], Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/i, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewtoE/minist.e/min01_e/mindecl-e.pdf (suggesting the start of negotiations on
modalities of cooperation towards the creation of a multilateral framework on antitrust
issues).
35. The issue of antitrust was dropped from the World Trade Organization's
("WTO") agenda in 2004. See General Council Decision, Doha Work Programme, § I (g),
WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/
ddadraft_3 1jul04_e.pdf.
36. See BLAKESLEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 131-66. As noted above, many
jurisdictions adopt doctrines that allow them to apply their laws extraterritorially. See id.
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generally fall within the first two types of cases described in the
typology above. 37 Agreements usually include a wide range of
cooperation standards. 38 They often include provisions with
regard to the sharing of information. This enables cooperative
unilateralism: with cooperative input from other interested
jurisdictions, the antitrust authority reviews and, as appropriate,
39
remedies situations that come within its laws.
Many agreements also adopt the positive comity principle,
which is designed to ensure nondiscrimination. 4° Pursuant to this
principle, foreign nations and persons adversely affected by
anticompetitive activities occurring in the territory of another
party, and contrary to the latter's antitrust laws, may request that
territory to investigate and, if warranted, to remedy these
activities in accordance with its laws. 41 Positive comity is thus met
when each nation implements its own national antitrust law in a
42
credible, nondiscriminatory, clear, and understandable way.
Such principles create vehicles to root out a common evil
where there is a preexisting disposition to cooperate and to
overcome the problem of non-enforcement or discriminatory
37. See id. at 186-91.
38. See generally REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
COOPERATION,
COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY (Andrew T. Guzman, ed.,

forthcoming 2010).
39. See Edward M. Graham & J. David Richardson, Competition Policiesfor the Global
Economy, 51 POLICY ANALYSES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES 49 (1997) (defining
concept of cooperative unilateralism).
40. See Mario Monti, Eur. Comm'r for Competition Policy, Remarks at the
American Bar Association Antitrust Section Forty Ninth Annual Spring Meeting: The EU
Views on Global Competition Forum (Mar. 29, 2001) (transcript available at
/147&format=
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/
PDF; see also, Comm. on Competition Law & Policy, OECD, Report: Making International
Markets More Efficient Through 'Positive Comity' in Competition Law Enforcement, at 2, EC
Reference No. SPEECH/01/147 (1999) [hereinafter Positive Comity], available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/3/2752161.pdf.
41. See Positive Comity, supra note 40.
42. See, e.g., Agreement Between the European Community and the Government of
Japan Concerning Cooperation on Anti-Competitive Activities, art. 5, 2003 O.J. L
183/12, at 14; Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of
Canada Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, §5, 1999 O.J. L 175/50,
at 52; Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Commission of
the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, art.
5, 1995 O.J. L 95/47, at 49; see also Agreement Between the European Communities and
the Government of the United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity
Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws, art. 3, 1998 O.J. L 173/28, at
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enforcement by foreign jurisdictions. Accordingly, they solve
some of the problems in type one and type two cases. Yet they
have limited effect where the antitrust principles adopted by the
cooperating jurisdictions differ significantly or where the
application of antitrust principles leads to different factual
conclusions, resulting from the fact that the effects of the
proposed conduct on foreign jurisdictions is not taken into
account. 43 Accordingly, comity principles offer no solution to
enforcement problems in type 3 and type 4 cases.
On this background, we now turn to the practical obstacles
faced by small and developing jurisdictions in applying these
tools in practice. Part III.A introduces the results of an empirical
study that reveals the enforcement patterns of small and
developing jurisdictions in international antitrust matters. Part
III.B analyzes the causes of the enforcement patterns found. Part
III.C discusses current solutions and their limitations. Part III.D
raises the issue of whether large jurisdictions can be perceived as
"enforcers for the world."
A.

EmpiricalFindings

The empirical study depicted below analyzes the
enforcement patterns of small and of developing jurisdictions in
international antitrust matters. It was conducted on forty-seven
countries. 44 Twenty of these forty-seven classify as small
jurisdictions (Armenia, Barbados, Cyprus, El Salvador, the Faroe
Islands, Fiji, Finland, Greenland, Israel, Jamaica, Jersey, Jordan,
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Panama,
Singapore, and Sweden) and twenty-nine are classified as
developing economies, some of which are also small (Argentina,
Armenia, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chile,
Colombia, Cote D'Ivoire, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau,
Hungary, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Mali, Mexico,
Niger, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal (both before and after it
entered the West African Economic and Monetary Union
("WAEMU")), Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The
43. See, e.g., INT'L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM., supra note 1, at 235
("[W]hile it is apparent that government representatives will maintain visible support
for positive comity, the emphasis now has shifted to the limited role it can achieve in
international cooperation.").
44. For a full listing of these countries, see Table 1, infra.
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remaining six jurisdictions (Canada, the European Union,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United States) served, to some
extent, as a comparison group. The study involved an analysis of
all cases with an international dimension over a period of five
years. 45 The data is based on answers to a questionnaire sent to
the competition authority of each jurisdiction, 46 interviews with
top officials in many of these countries, and research through
other channels such as annual reports issued by these authorities.
The results of the study are reported in Table 1.
Jurisdictions were asked to provide data with regard to the
number of international cartels (defined as cartels that affected
more than one jurisdiction), monopolization (abuse of
dominance) cases, and international mergers (defined as
mergers that involved at least one foreign firm) that they
investigated in the past five years. 47 Jurisdictions were also asked
to specify which mergers were likely to affect other jurisdictions
as well, but this information was difficult to obtain since most
jurisdictions do not consider the effects of the merger on other
jurisdictions and thus do not classify them accordingly. Instead, a
case-by-case analysis was conducted, when possible, to gather
such information. Due to this difficulty, the table might overstate
48
the enforcement activities with regard to international mergers.
Countries were also asked to provide the number of domestic
cases in each category in order to indicate general enforcement
levels. However, only several jurisdictions responded to this
request as is apparent from the table.
The study clearly indicates that small and developing

45. As indicated in Table 1, infra, not all agencies were established five or more
years ago. Thus, for some, the period is shorter.
46. The questionnaire was sent to all jurisdictions that adopted a competition law.
Fifty-six responses to the questionnaire were received (more than half of the
jurisdictions with operational competition agencies at the relevant time). Several
jurisdictions indicated that they could not provide the requested data or provided data
that was not useful. When the data was not useful, follow-up questions were sent, which

sometimes helped clarify the relevance of the data.
47. Due to problems in collecting data, the periods to which the data relate do not
always overlap. The periods covered a range from 1999 to 2008. Also, jurisdictions with
relatively new competition laws only covered the periods after the laws came into force.
48. The data might also understate the number of abuse and cartel investigations,
since it does not capture the possibility that the antitrust agency might choose to
informally reach an agreement with the relevant firms to change their conduct.
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countries rarely tackle international antitrust issues. 49 It also
shows that other parameters also have some effect on
enforcement levels: the maturity of the agency (approximated by
the number of years since its establishment) as well as being part
of an operational regional enforcement alliance (such as the
EU).
The empirical evidence demonstrates low enforcement
levels of monopolization prohibitions against foreign firms. An
interesting observation is that small and developing jurisdictions
generally do not bring suits in monopolization cases in which the
conduct affects many jurisdictions (like the cases against
Microsoft, Intel, or Rambus). Nonetheless, they sometimes bring
such cases against subsidiaries of large companies when the
50
conduct is specific to their markets.
Figure 2 portrays graphically the limited number of cases
brought by small and developing countries against foreign firms
on monopolization charges. As can be clearly seen, sixty-nine
percent of small and developing jurisdictions in the study
brought no such cases, nineteen percent brought three or fewer
case, and only eleven percent brought more than three cases
over a course of five years (Zambia is an outlier with fifty-four
cases, due to the fact that its modus operandi is based on
receiving concessions from dominant firms to reduce their prices
or otherwise change their trading conditions; 51 the same is true
49. A host of additional factors affect the ability and incentives of jurisdictions to
enforce their antitrust laws on international antitrust matters. These might include, for
example, political considerations and the size, level of expertise, and funding of the
antitrust authority. It should be noted, however, that these factors are oftentimes
connected to size and economic development the jurisdiction. Developing jurisdictions
are generally characterized by less expertise, funding, and political influence. See, e.g.,
Michal S. Gal, The Ecology of Antitrust: Preconditionsfor Antitrust Enforcement in Developing
Countries, in

COMPETITION, COMPETITIVENESS AND

DEVELOPMENT:

LESSONS

FROM

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 22, 22-52 (Phillipe Brusick et al. eds., 2004). Small jurisdictions
often have low funding, in absolute terms, and small agencies.
50. For example, the Jamaican Fair Trading Commission brought suit against the
local subsidiaries of cable and wireless providers for abusing their market power in the
Jamaican market. See Barbara Lee, Executive Dir. of the Caribbean Community
Competition Comm'n, Presentation at a Workshop Hosted by the Ministry of Trade &
Industry of Trinidad & Tobago with the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 52007),
available
at
http://www.jftc.com/newpdf/
6
(June
12-13,
Jamaica's Experience in Competition Law Enforcement[ 1]. A Snapshot.pdf.
51. See Response to Questionnaire, Zambia Competition Comm'n (2008) (on file
with author) ("The Zambia Competition Commission's approach to cases of abuse of
dominance has largely been an administrative 'cease and desist' approach to the parties
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00
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Figure 3. Number of monopolization cases brought by small and
developing jurisdictions against foreign firms.

00
* 1-2

113+

Figure 2. Number of monopolization cases brought by small and
developing jurisdictions against foreign firms.
involved. For this reason, there has been no firm, domestic or foreign, that has been
prosecuted for abuse of dominant position and market power. Further, due to limited
financial resources and ajudiciary perceived not to be 'competition law' competent, all
the cases have been resolved administratively, thus sending no 'deterrent effect' message
to business.").
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of Kenya and explains the nine cases that it brought).52 Many of
these cases were brought against local subsidiaries of
international firms and all involved local abuse issues rather than
abuses that affected international markets. Yet it is noteworthy
that in general the number of monopolization cases, whether
against domestic or against international firms, is generally low in
mostjurisdictions, regardless of size or the level of development.
Similarly, only four of the twenty small jurisdictions
surveyed, three of which had mature and sophisticated antitrust
authorities (New Zealand, Sweden, and Israel), brought cases
against international cartels, and two of these four brought only
one such case. Interestingly, those international cartels that were
tackled significantly affected only small jurisdictions. For
example, the only international cartel that Israel dealt with in the
relevant period was a cartel between an Israeli and a Cypriot
company that agreed to limit competition on salt products in
both jurisdictions. This cartel had no effect on other
jurisdictions. Moreover, the administrative declaration of the
existence of the cartel issued by the Israeli Competition Authority
53
only applied to the Israeli firm.
Similarly, only seven out of the twenty-nine developing
jurisdictions brought cases against international cartels. The
majority of these jurisdictions brought three cases or fewer over a
period of five years. This occurred despite the fact that
international cartels often significantly affected their domestic

52. See Conversation with Hassan Qaqaya, Head, Competition Law and Consumer
Policies Branch, UNCTAD, in Munich, Germany (Jan. 30, 2009); Response to
Questionnaire, Kenya Dep't of Treasury (2008) (on file with author) ("Abuse of
dominance complaints against foreign firms over the same period was intermittent
(about 10 in number). Most of these were reported in the beverages sector. Others were
in the shipping lines, cigarette manufacturing and international money transfer services.
We brought up varying orders to streamline the competition process. One involved
ordering the concerned parties to delete anti competitive clauses contained in their
agency contracts, to conform to the requirements of the Competition Law.").
53. See Director, Isr. Antitrust Authority, Finding Under Section 43(a)(1) of the
Antitrust Law, Israel Salt Industries Group, Ltd.-Party to Restrictive Arrangement with
MP Theodorou (Salt Industry) & Co., Ltd., and Its Owner 1 (Apr. 2, 2006), available at
http://eng-archive.antitrust.gov.il/files/46/Israel Salt Industries.pdf.
This
case
is
analyzed in Michal S. Gal, Extra-territorialApplication of Antitrust-The Case of a Small
Economy (Israel), in REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note

38 (forthcoming 2010).
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markets 54 and that many international cartels exist. One study
indicated, for example, that at least eighty international cartels
that affected Latin America and were prosecuted elsewhere by
55
non-Latin American agencies.
Figure 3 illustrates the results graphically. As can be seen,
the percentage of small and developing jurisdictions that
brought international cartel cases is very small.
Contrast these findings with comparable figures in large,
established jurisdictions. The United States investigated fifty-four
international cartels over the course of the five-year period.
Canada, whose market is smaller than that of many developing
jurisdictions, opened twenty-nine investigations over a period of
five years. 56 The EU brought twenty-seven cases against
international cartels over the relevant period. The differences
between these three jurisdictions and small or developing ones
are, undoubtedly, significant. 57 The role of large economies as
"enforcers for the world" is analyzed below.
Interestingly, the research also revealed that several firms
headquartered in small or developing jurisdictions set aside
funds for the payment of potential damages or fines to large
jurisdictions, indicating their perceived risk of a finding that they
participated in an international cartel that potentially affected
54. Of course, one may argue that low levels of enforcement may result from
successful enforcement, since the stronger the deterrent effect of the legal prohibitions,
the lower the number of cartels that would be formed-and thus detected-in the first
place. As noted, however, the available data suggests otherwise. See Connor & Helmers,
supra note 8, at 1.
55. See John M. Connor, Latin America and the Control of International Cartels, in
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 29, 314-151 (Eleanor M. Fox & D.
Daniel Sokol eds., 2009) [hereinafter John M. Connor, Latin America].
56. Greater Canadian enforcement might be explained by cooperation between
Canadian and U.S. antitrust agencies due to the similar impact of antitrust cases on their
economies.
57. A study conducted by Connor indicates that out of the US$9.352 million
imposed as fines on global cartels between 1990-2007, the United States imposed
US$3.736 million (40.0%); the EU Commission, US$5.124 million (54.8%); European
countries, US$318.6 million (3.4%); Canada, US$155.4 million (1.7%); Asian countries,
US$10.4 million (0.001%); Oceania, US$7 million (0.00075%); Latin America, US$0.2
million (0.002%); and that African countries did not impose any fines. See John M.
Connor, The United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division's Cartel Enforcement:
Appraisal and Proposals 92 tbl.2 (American Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 08-02,
2008),
available
at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/
Cartel Report Working Paper08-02_071320081905.pdf [hereinafter Connor, Appraisal &
Proposals].
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the domestic market also. 58 Despite this precaution, the
authorities in these jurisdictions chose not to initiate domestic
investigations.
Turning to merger review, the data collected indicates that
while the antitrust authorities of small or developing countries
often review international mergers, they seldom attempt to
prohibit a merger between international firms. 59 Indeed, despite
the high number of international mergers reviewed, in only a
small percentage were mergers prohibited or conditional. As
elaborated below, conditions focus on limiting the direct
consequences of a merger within the respective jurisdiction.
Those rare instances in which small or developing jurisdictions
prohibited a merger with international dimensions occurred
where the merging entities mainly operated in the small or
developing jurisdiction and at least one of the merging parties
was of domestic nationality. 60 One prominent example is the Air
New Zealand-Qantas merger that was blocked by the New
Zealand Commerce Commission. 61 The merger mainly affected
New Zealand and Australian consumers, although it did
58. The two cases involve the international freight cartel in which the Israeli firm of
El Al Israel Airlines Ltd., set aside US$20 million in anticipation of a possible settlement
with the U.S. Department ofJustice and the Chilean firm of LAN Cargo set aside US$25
million in anticipation of possible fines in the EU. See LAN Airlines S.A., Report of
Foreign Private Issuer (Form 6-K), at 5 (Jan. 29, 2009) ("The Company has decided to
maintain the US$25 million reserve accounted for in its fourth quarter 2007 results. This
reserve is a precautionary estimate ... in connection with the ongoing European
Commission investigation."); Tova Cohen, Israel's El Al to Make $20 Million Provision,
REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/AIRLIN/idUSL2624175320080526.
59. Several jurisdictions have opted for a voluntary notification procedure. These
include, inter alia, Panama, Peru, Venezuela and Chile. See Inter-Am. Dev. Bank &
OECD, Merger Control Laws and Procedures in Latin America and the Caribbean 14 (2005),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/57/38835612.pdf.
60. Some small jurisdictions are, however, quite aggressive in applying their merger
notice requirements. Jersey, for instance, fined three international firms for failing to
notify authorities of the merger, even though it did not have a significant negative
impact on its economy. Jersey Competition Regulatory Auth., Decision C332/08 (Aug. 1,
2009), available at http://www.jcra.je/pdf/091027 Lufthansa Decision final public.pdf;
Jersey Competition Regulatory Auth., Decision M170/08 (Jan. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.jcra.je/pdf/080205 Decision re TUI AG.pdf; Jersey Competition Regulatory
Auth., Decision M152/08 (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.jcraje/pdf/
071220 Decision re Autogrill.pdf.
61. See N.Z. Commerce Comm'n, Final Determination in the Matter Involving Air
New Zealand Ltd. and Qantas Airways Ltd., No. J5633 (Oct. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/BusinessCompetition/Anti-competitivePractices/
Applications/ContentFiles/Documents/FinalDetermination.pdf.
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marginally impact other jurisdictions as well.62 It is noteworthy
that some small and developing countries simply relinquish their
power to block mergers between international firms that do not
have local subsidiaries because of their inability to discipline the
63
parties to such mergers.
Quite ironically, enforcement levels are at their highest in
the area of antitrust enforcement in which lower levels would
have generally benefited total global welfare. Indeed, the parallel
review by different jurisdictions has created an obstacle for procompetitive or neutral international mergers due to the sheer
number of jurisdictions which require filings. However, because
merger notification procedures place the onus on the merging
entities to submit the necessary documents, small size or low
development does not affect enforcement levels. This overdeterrent effect is strengthened by the fact that, as noted above,
only a handful of these jurisdictions actually regulate
international mergers that harm their jurisdictions.
Finally, it is important to note that the results also indicated
that operational regional antitrust agreements also affected the
level of enforcement. More specifically, EU Member States enjoy
enforcement by the EU, which has the authority to investigate
any anticompetitive conduct having effect on trade among its
members. 64 Accordingly, the EU dealt with most international
antitrust issues. Thus, the size of a member state or its level of
development had much less significance on enforcement levels.
Unfortunately, most regional antitrust agreements among small
or developing jurisdictions are yet in their first stages of
65
operation.

62. This is an outcome of the fact that most routes operated by Air New Zealand
were within New Zealand and within it and Australia. See Cross Submission on Behalf of
Qantas & Air New Zealand, Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Qantas-Air New
Zealand Proposed Alliance: A Conceptual and Empirical Assessment 1 (2003), available
at
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/BusinessCompetition/Anti-competitivePractices/
Applications/ContentFiles/Documents/airnzqantasmorrisonwinston.pdf.
63. See, e.g., Restrictive Trade Practices Law § 17, 5748-1988, 42 LSI 135 (1987-88)
(Isr.); 1992 Competition Law § 2 (Green.), repealed &y2007 Competition Law (Green.).
64. SeeEC Treaty arts. 81-82, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 73-75.
65. See, e.g., UNCTAD, Restrictive Business Practices That Have an Effect in More Than
One Country, in Particular Developing and Other Countries, With Overall Conclusions
Regarding the Issues Raised by These Cases, at 16, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF.4/6 (Sept. 4,
1995); see also Michal S. Gal, Regional Agreements: An Important Step in International
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B.

The Causes of Limited Enforcement

Are small and developing jurisdictions acting irrationally,
especially since international antitrust issues can create
significant negative effects on them? 66 I suggest not. As this part
elaborates, low enforcement levels are driven by practical
obstacles coupled with pure economic considerations based on
67
the costs of enforcement relative to its benefits.
Let me start with practical enforcement problems. Small
jurisdictions can rarely make a credible threat to prohibit the
conduct of a foreign firm. Consider an example of an
international merger that has no negative welfare effects on the
large jurisdictions. 68 If trade in the small state is only a small part
of the foreign firm's total world operation, the gains from trade
within it are limited. Accordingly, the firm would most likely
choose to exit the small country and trade in other jurisdictions
if the small jurisdiction imposed significant restrictions. The
foreign firm will choose to do so if the loss of revenues from
terminating its trade in the small country and the possible
increase in overall production costs, if the firm faces scale
economies over the whole range of production, are smaller than
the increase of revenues it anticipates achieving as a result of the
merger elsewhere.
In practice, however, this type of exit will rarely occur. This
is because the negative welfare effects on the small country from
the exit of the foreign firm may well be greater than the negative
Antitrust (forthcoming 2010) (on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1505543 [hereinafter Gal, Regional Agreements].
66. See, e.g., Aditya Bhattacharjea, Export Cartels-A Developing Country Perspective 38
J. WORLD TRADE 331, 335 (2004); Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 7, at 802.
67. Of course, low levels of enforcement may not necessarily indicate that welfare is
harmed. For one, it might be the case that small and developing jurisdictions do not
suffer from anticompetitive conduct. While this proposition is theoretically valid, it is
most likely unrealistic, given the strong economic motivations of firms to engage in
anticompetitive conduct, especially where such conduct is rarely prohibited. See, e.g.,
Frfd~ic Jenny, Cartels and Collusion in Developing Countries: Lessons from Empirical
Evidence, 29 WORLD COMPETITION 109 (2006). Second, enforcement might be welfare
reducing where conduct is erroneously prevented, even though it does not have
anticompetitive effects (type two errors). In such cases, less enforcement is better than
more. But absent indications that many or most enforcement actions of small and
developing jurisdictions suffer from this error, it may be assumed that low levels of
enforcement against international firms are below optimal.
68. This part is based, in part, on GAL, supra note 5, 240-49. It shall be assumed
that the large jurisdiction is also a developed one unless otherwise noted.
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effects from its continued operation within its borders.
Therefore, a small country usually has limited incentives to
prevent the merged entity from trading within its borders even if
it engaged in a harmful merger. 69 The foreign firm,
acknowledging this effect, will not take into account the effect
that a merger will have on the small country. Instead, it will only
consider the effects of the merger on its own profits in that
70
market.
In essence, small jurisdictions act as if they were applying a
world-wide total welfare standard, since the large jurisdictions
that have approved the merger represent a much larger share of
consumers than they do. Such limited and often non-existent
veto power implies that the incentives of small countries are not
represented in the merger review equation. This can have
significant consequences on their domestic markets, as
exemplified by Unilever-Best Foods merger.71 Even if the increase
in market power resulting from the merger is accompanied by
increased efficiencies, these will rarely be realized by the small
jurisdiction because the production facilities are located outside
its borders and more often than not markets in the small
jurisdiction are highly concentrated and thus more prone to the
realization of market power. 72
A similar analysis applies in many cartel and monopolization
cases. Indeed, the research indicated that large foreign importers
sometimes use an explicit or an implicit threat of exit, once the
small or developing jurisdiction attempts to impose upon them
limitations which they may agree to if imposed by a large
economy. 73 Microsoft, for example, has refused to sign an

69. See id., at 243.
70. As elaborated below, the small country might, however, impose some localized
conditions that attempt to reduce at least part of the negative welfare effects of the
merger upon theirjurisdiction. See infra text accompanying note 105.
71. See supra, note 17.
72. See GAL, supranote 5, at 19.
73. In some cases this is true also for larger economies. For example, when the
Korean Fair Trade Commission ("KFTC") started an investigation of Microsoft for
bundling its media player into its operating system, Microsoft publicly announced that
"If the KFTC enters an order requiring Microsoft to remove code or redesign Windows
uniquely for the Korean market, it might be necessary to withdraw Windows from the
Korean market or delay offering new versions in Korea unless the remedial order is
stayed or overturned on appeal." Microsoft Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 33
(Oct. 27, 2005).
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agreement limiting its conduct in Israel, 74 even though the
conditions were necessary in order to address the unique
characteristics of the Israeli market and the terms were similar to
75
those included in the agreement that it reached with the EU.
The implied threat of exit meant that the market for Hebrewsupported operating systems would not be developed.
Developing jurisdictions also often suffer from an inability
to create a credible threat of antitrust enforcement, much like
small ones, although to a somewhat more limited extent. The
fact that developing economies often represent a large number
of consumers may limit this risk relative to small jurisdictions, yet
it is still significant in specific product markets which are small or
do not carry high profits due to the low level of development. To
the extent that the development of their industries depends
upon the importation of raw materials, intermediate
components, and capital goods from foreign firms, such risks
carry much weight.
Political obstacles might also stand in the way of a small or
developing country attempting to prevent a merger or joint
venture among foreign firms, or even to take a strong stance
against an export cartel or a foreign dominant firm. If the effects
of such conduct are positive in the home jurisdiction or in other
jurisdictions (higher taxes, lower unemployment, lower
production costs), the small or developing country might
encounter political resistance to its decision from the home
jurisdiction. This consideration is based on a presumption that
the country's size or level of development is positively correlated
with its political power.
In addition, small and developing jurisdictions often have
limited resources to combat anticompetitive conduct,7 6 and in
turn have a limited ability to take on international conduct that

74. See See Interview with Dror Strum, former Dir., Israeli Antitrust Auth., in
Jerusalem, Isr. (2007); see also Gal, supra note 53, at 16.
75. See Commission Press Release, IP/07/1567 (Oct. 22, 2007).
76. Antitrust authorities in developing jurisdictions often have very little financial
and human endowments. Small economies have small endowments in absolute terms,
although their endowment might be similar to those of large economies in relative
terms, when analyzed as a percentage of their total budges or per capita. See Gal, supra
note 53, at 17.
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negatively affects their jurisdiction. 77 In general, the size or the
level of development of a jurisdiction does not affect the "fixed"
costs of conducting an antitrust inquiry. Fixed costs are incurred
regardless of the size of the economy, because the analytical steps
of the analysis are similar in markets of all sizes. A smaller
endowment therefore naturally enables the authority to deal with
fewer cases. This problem is even more pronounced in
international antitrust cases because the international dimension
generally increases the costs of bringing a suit. First, evidence
might need to be gathered from myriad and sometimes foreign
sources, an exercise which is costly and time consuming. The fact
that firms from developing and small countries rarely participate
in such cartels 78 further implies that the gathering of evidence
and enforcement of remedies is even more difficult. Secondly,
these jurisdictions often do not enjoy voluntary cooperation from
foreign witnesses, a fact that necessitates engagement in
additional costly procedures. Third, challenging a foreign firm
usually generates a high level of legal defense. It is often difficult
for an agency with limited financial and human resources to
match such expertise and resources, even if it has a sound case
against a foreign firm. Small and developing jurisdictions will
have limited ability to pursue such cases.
This effect is underscored by the fact that the benefits of
enforcement are generally small for these jurisdictions,
compared to the high costs. As elaborated below, the
enforcement activities of large jurisdictions usually prevent the
continuation of the cartel. The additional deterrent effect of the
small and developing jurisdictions is often marginal. This is
because in many jurisdictions fines are quite low, as they are
often based on turnover levels in the jurisdiction. In addition, if
the relevant executives serve jail time in another (generally large)
jurisdiction, the small or developing state would generally not
impose additional jail sentences. From the perspective of the
small or developing jurisdiction, the decision to forego

77. Many developing economies treat antitrust laws with ambivalence. Some
believe, for example, that it is not always in their best interest to limit the cartelistic or
monopolistic activities of their domestic firms. See Frederick Michael Scherer,
Competition Policy, Domestic and International401 (2000). Such an analysis is, however,
beyond the scope of this Article.
78. See Connor & Helmers, supra note 8, at 34.
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prosecution of international cartels that are prosecuted
elsewhere is thus generally rational. Moreover, these jurisdictions
must use their scarce resources to investigate and prosecute
purely domestic anticompetitive issues. Nonetheless, as
elaborated below, the cumulative effect of these decisions is
harmful to international welfare.
In some cases, however, low enforcement levels result from
the inability of small and developing jurisdictions to obtain the
relevant information.7 9 Oftentimes such authorities cannot
receive the relevant factual information from those authorities
that have prosecuted the firms because of secrecy issues. For
example, the New Zealand Competition Authority considered
bringing a case against the Vitamins cartel after it was prosecuted
elsewhere. 0 However, it could not obtain the pertinent
information because the U.S. Department of Justice was
prevented, under its plea bargain agreement with the relevant
firms, from disclosing the relevant information. 81 In this case, the
U.S. authority made a strategic decision to limit the number of
possible world-wide prosecutions against the cartel in order to
ensure that it be brought to trial in the United States.8 2 Even
from a global welfare point of view, taking into account suboptimal levels of deterrence, this may well have been a sound
decision.
The level of maturity of the agency also affects its ability to
deal with international antitrust issues. This point, which is
especially relevant to developing countries, can be best illustrated
through a real-world example. Several U.S. manufacturers
engaged in a sophisticated cartel agreement in the form of
territorial restraints in Latin America. 83 In order to reduce the
transparency of their conduct, they devised a scheme under

79. See Response to Questionnaire, Geoff Thorn, Gen. Manager, N.Z. Commerce
Comm'n (2007) (on file with author).
80. See Connor, Vitamins, supra note 14; Interview with Attorney for U.S. plaintiffs
in Vitamins class action lawsuit (2008). While researching this Article, the author
interviewed numerous individuals involved with international antitrust cases. Certain
individuals requested that the author withhold their identities and the dates and
locations of the interviews in order to preserve their anonymity.
81. See Interview with Attorney for U.S. plaintiffs in Vitamins class action lawsuit,
supra note 80.
82. See id.
83. See id.
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which each firm committed to sell only a predetermined quantity
in each state in which the cartel operated.8 4 They also agreed to
vary the quantities of each firm every year, while keeping the
overall profitability of each firm stable.8 5 Although allegations of
cartelistic conduct were brought to the attention of several Latin
American antitrust authorities, they did not find any restraint on
trade.8 6 The authorities relied, inter alia, on the fluctuation of
trade levels in their jurisdiction as an indication of competition
to reach this conclusion. 87 Institutional issues might also play a
factor. For example, heads of competition authorities which have
a relatively weak position within the administration and expect to
serve only a short period in their role might prefer quick, highimpact cases rather than ones that are expected to take a long
time and create some political resistance due to the ties of the
88
foreign firm with the political and business elite.
An additional factor that often plays a role in low
enforcement levels of developing jurisdictions involves a lack of
competition culture that often leads to primacy of immediate
industrial policy considerations over competitive concerns. In
some cases antitrust enforcement against foreign firms is
regarded as an obstacle to foreign investment, which is
considered an important element in a country's development.
Another factor involves political influences that are difficult for
relatively weak antitrust authorities to counter.8 9 Indeed, large,

84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Some countries, however, take an opposite view. Many Chinese view the new
antitrust law as a tool for mainly regulating the conduct of foreign firms. See, e.g., China
Adopts Anti-Monopoly Law, CHINA DAiLY,
Aug. 30,
2007,
available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn//-08//_6069209.htm. China is, however, a unique and
exceptional case, due to the size of its markets and its high rate of development, which
make it easier for it to create a credible threat of enforcement.
89. See, e.g., Gal, supra note 49, 31-33. In Zambia, for example, a large foreign
financial entity attempted to discredit the decision of the authority by soliciting
government intervention based on what it perceived as its important contribution to the
Zambian economy. See Interview with Zambian antitrust official (2008) (The identity of
this speaker and the date and location of the interview have been withheld in order to
preserve the anonymity of the representative). In Colombia the director of the antitrust
agency is appointed by the President and can be removed at any time by him. It was
rumored that one of the directors was removed from office due, in part, to a case he
brought against foreign-owned credit card companies. See Interview with Columbian
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multinational firms often have strong ties with the political and
business elite in small and developing jurisdictions. 90 These ties
sometimes translate into political pressure not to enforce the laws
in international antitrust cases. To further complicate matters,
the local firm that participates in an international cartel might be
regarded as a local hero rather than a villain.
The foregoing analysis leads to the following conclusion:
Extraterritoriality is an efficient tool for large jurisdictions that
possess sufficient power over foreign firms to command
obedience, but small or developing jurisdictions often lack the
requisite power and resources to discipline foreign entities that
harm them. Their existing policy choices can generally be
summarized as ineffective extraterritoriality.
Yet, at least in the case of developing countries, the causes
for limited unilateral enforcement may change significantly.
Indeed, as countries develop a competent antitrust authority and
a competition culture and their markets become more
competitive, unilateral enforcement in international antitrust
cases may increase dramatically. Small jurisdictions, on the other
hand, can generally solve their enforcement problems only by
joining forces with other jurisdictions or by regulating some types
of conduct as elaborated in the following section.
C.

Current Solutions and their Limitations

As the analysis above indicates, small and developing
countries often treat international anticompetitive conduct as
given. 91 Some nevertheless attempt to regulate the conduct that
directly affects their local markets, although their tools are
generally more costly and less effective than prohibiting the
conduct from occurring.
One option is the imposition of structural and behavioral
conditions on merging parties that apply only to their operation

antitrust official (2008) (The identity of this speaker and the date and location of the
interview have been withheld in order to preserve the anonymity of the representative).
90. See Gal, supra note 49, at 32. For small economies see, e.g., GAL, supranote 5, at
49. For developing jurisdictions see, e.g., POLITICS TRIUMPHS ECONOMICS?: POLITICAL
ECONOMY AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW AND

REGULATION

IN

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (VOLUME II) (Pradeep S. Mehta & Simon J. Evenett, eds.,
2009), available at http://www.circ.in/pdf/PoliticsTriumphsEconomics-Vol2.pdf.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
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within the small or developing jurisdiction. The Jersey case of
Ferryspeed-ChannelExpressprovides an interesting example of a
structural divestiture remedy. 92 The Jersey Competition
Regulatory Authority decided that the merger would significantly
limit competition in the market for seaborne temperaturecontrolled freight services between Jersey and the United
Kingdom. A central factor to the case was that the merger would
create a further concentration of suitable warehouse space in
Jersey's harbor, which created a significant barrier for
competition. The Authority thus refused to approve the merger.
In response, the parties restructured their agreement and sold a
warehouse to a third party freight operator. The Authority
concluded that the restructuring substantially addressed the
competitive concerns, as it provided a new entrant with a key
asset necessary to compete in the market. The Authority,
accordingly, approved the merger in its new form.
More commonly, competition authorities in small or
developing jurisdictions choose to apply behavioral remedies. An
interesting example is the Israeli case of Unilever.9 3 Unilever's
proposed acquisition of Ben & Jerry's raised concerns regarding
competition in the Israeli ice cream market. 94 The Competition
Authority did not prohibit the merger. It did, however, condition
approval on Ben & Jerry's use of an independent distributor in
Israel with freedom to determine prices charged for the
products. The Authority also required that all new products
would be made available to the distributor. These are limited
remedies because they cannot totally mitigate the fact that both
firms are now controlled by the same entity that determines their
strategic decisions. At the same time, this arrangement enabled
reliance on the fact that an international firm will not change its
strategic decisions (such as Ben & Jerry's introduction of new
products elsewhere) only to reduce competition in the small
jurisdiction.

92. Jersey Competition Regulatory Auth., Decision M005/05 (July 3, 2006),
available at http://www.jcra.je/pdf/060711 final public version decision ferryspeed.pdf.
93. See Dror Strum, Dir. of Israeli Competition Auth., Conditions for the Approval
of a Merger Between Ben &Jerry's Homemade Inc. and Unilever N.y (Dec. 16, 2001)
(Isr.) [hereinafter Unilever-Ben &Jerry's (Isr.) ].
94. The merger was subject to approval because both firms were part of large food
conglomerates that also controlled the major players in the Israeli ice-cream market.

2009]

ANTITRUST IN A GLOBALIZED ECONOMY

Another possible solution is the creation of regional
competition authorities that aggregate the power and resources
of several jurisdictions to create a credible threat to foreign firms
that reduce welfare within member states. 95 If, for example, a
sufficient number of jurisdictions join forces to prevent a foreign
merger, then this might create sufficient economic incentives for
foreign firms to abandon their attempts to merge. For such an
action to pose a credible threat, the threat of limited access to
such jurisdictions must have a significant effect on the merged
entities' profitability in order to offset the gains from the
proposed merger in other jurisdictions. 9 6 All jurisdictions also
must be prepared to block the entry of the merged entity into
their markets in the event that the merger does go through. The
fact that the welfare effects on one jurisdiction do not generally
coincide with the welfare effects on another (in economic terms,
there is no zero-sum game) eliminates some of the coordination
problems that are present in other forms of collective action.
Such regional agreements might also create an enforcement
power that might countervail the domination of international
antitrust issues by the large jurisdictions. Indeed, a growing
number of small and developing jurisdictions are entering into
regional agreements, yet most have not tackled international
97
antitrust issues as of yet.
In addition, many developing jurisdictions have agreements
for technical assistance with large jurisdictions.98 These
agreements are mainly designed to alleviate type 1 cases by
by the
developing
unilateral
enforcement
increasing
jurisdiction. 99 Yet the data makes it debatable whether technical
assistance programs have, as of yet, significantly enhanced the
ability of developing jurisdictions to apply their laws unilaterally
to international firms.
95. See George Lipimile & Elizabeth Gachuiri, Allocation of Competences Between
National and Regional Competition Authorities: The Case of COMESA, in COMPETITION
PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 32, at 361, 380-81; see also Gal,
RegionalAgreements, supra note 65 (manuscript at 7).
96. See supra discussion accompanying note 68.
97. See, e.g., Gal, RegionalAgreements, supra note 65 (manuscript at 2).
98. See, e.g., Michael W. Nicholson, D. Daniel Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, Assessing the
Efficiency of Antitrust/Competition Policy Technical Assistance Programs (Paper prepared for
the 2006 ICN Cape Town Conference, Working Subgroup on Technical Assistance
Implementation).
99. Id. at 4-5.
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Finally, let me suggest a novel solution that holds the
potential to solve at least some of the problems faced by small
and developing jurisdictions when applying their laws to
international antitrust issues.. As noted above, one of the main
obstacles that small and developing jurisdictions face when
applying their laws extraterritorially is the high cost involved in
bringing a case. 100 A possible partial solution to this problem
involves legal reliance of small and developing jurisdictions on
the determinations of foreign courts with regard to the existence
of international cartels. This would significantly reduce the level
of resources needed and would enable the authority to focus
solely on the cartel's domestic effects. Of course, this type of
reliance would have to be based on the final rulings from a
jurisdiction with a comparable burden of proof and with a
reliable and well-functioning court system. It is comparable, to
some extent, to the reliance of different jurisdictions on
decisions regarding the fulfillment of conditions regarding the
issuance of a patent in other jurisdictions. This solution is fraught
with political issues, but it holds some promise for enabling small
and developing jurisdictions to enforce their antitrust laws
against foreign firms, thereby increasing the deterrent effect
against international cartels and international abuses of
dominance.101
D.

Large Economies as Enforcersfor the World?

Small and developing countries often "free ride" on the
enforcement efforts of other jurisdictions in the international
arena. As noted above, large jurisdictions have brought a
significant number of cases against international firms since the
102
mid-1990s.
Indeed, in type 2 cases, which negatively affect all
jurisdictions concerned, such enforcement often has direct and
immediate positive spillover effects on other jurisdictions. The
prohibitions against the Vitamins Cartel, for example, prevented
100. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
101. This solution is elaborated in Michal S. Gal, Free Movement of Judgments:
Increasing Deterrence of InternationalCartels ThroughJurisdictionalReliance 9-17 (N.Y. Univ.
Law and Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 154, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1291844.
102. See Connor, Appraisaland Proposals,supra note 57, at 92.
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the continuation of the cartel worldwide. 103 Likewise, the United
States v. Microsoft antitrust case effected worldwide markets for
10 4
personal computer operating systems.
Moreover, the type of evidence gathered and the economic
and legal analysis may be common to all countries, large and
small, developed and developing. This might save resources for
small and developing countries wishing to bring cases and
provide a better prospect for reaching a similar legal outcome. In
addition, a multinational company might be more willing to
agree to limit its anticompetitive activity in a small or developing
country, if such limits mirror or parallel conditions imposed by a
large one. Compliance might be motivated by both psychological
and political motivations. Coca Cola, for example, agreed to
restrain its conduct in several small countries in the same fashion
that was required by a consent decree in the EU. 10 5 Yet, as noted
10 6
above, this is not always the case.
Significantly, some of the choices that large jurisdictions
make in applying their antitrust laws have positive externalities
on foreign jurisdictions. For example, adopting a consumer
welfare test, rather than a total welfare test as in the United States
and the EU, reduces the number of cases that will be approved
which are welfare-reducing on foreign jurisdictions. This is
because efficiencies to domestic producers are given less
07
weight.1
It is far from obvious, however, that the prevention of
anticompetitive conduct by a large jurisdiction also benefits small
and developing jurisdictions. For one, enforcement efforts by
103. See generally Connor, Vitamins, supra note 14 (discussing the Vitamins Cartel
case).
104. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952
(2001). For the findings of fact, see Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 (D.D.C. 1999) and for
the conclusions of law, see Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
105. See Commission Notice, 2004 O.J. C 289/10. For the precise text of the
proposed restrictions see Coca-Cola, Inc., Undertaking, Case COMP/39.116/B-2-CocaCola (Oct. 19, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/
decisions/39116/tccc final_undertaking_041019.pdf; see, e.g., Dir. Gen. of the Isr.
Antitrust Auth., Directions for a Monopolist: The Central Company for Production of
Soft Drinks, Inc. (May 10, 1998), available at http://archive.antitrust.gov.il/
ANTItem.aspx?ID=1406&FromSubject=&FromYear=2009&FromPage=0.
106. See supra text accompanying note 75.
107. For an interesting discussion of this point see ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note
20, at 1013-14.
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large jurisdictions against worldwide cartels do not necessarily
prevent their operation beyond their borders. Empirical
evidence suggests that some cartels are set up in a way that
reduces or prevents negative welfare effects on jurisdictions with
strong anti-cartel enforcement, relative to other jurisdictions. 0 8
Likewise, prevention of abusive practices in one jurisdiction often
does not prevent the continuation of those practices in other
jurisdictions, unless the firm cannot separate its modes of
operation around the world. This latter point can be illustrated
by the EU investigation of Intercontinental Marketing Services
("IMS"), the world leader in collecting data on prescriptions and
sales of pharmaceutical products. IMS is present in more than
one hundred countries worldwide. 09 The EU investigated tying
and loyalty discount practices that were not based on objective
criteria, which made entry and viability by new competitors
difficult in the EU.II0 The investigation was terminated after IMS
changed its practices within the EU.1 1' However, this does not
prevent IMS from adopting similar practices in other
jurisdictions that would need to prove similar anticompetitive
effects within their markets.
More importantly, as noted above, the level of the monetary
sanctions imposed by large jurisdictions on international cartels
often creates under-deterrence."12 The fines and damages
currently imposed are disproportionate relative to the profits
obtained elsewhere because they are based on harm to the
domestic jurisdiction imposing them and are only pursued by a
handful of jurisdictions. One study indicated that only sixty-one
percent of global cartel profits were disgorged." And if the
probability of detection is somewhere between thirteen to
108. See, e.g., Julian L. Clarke & Simon Evenett, The Deterrent Effects of National
Anticartel Laws: Evidence from the International Vitamins Cartel, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 689,
692 (2003).
109. See, Intercontinental Mktg. Servs., Locations, http://wvw.imshealth.com
(follow "Company Information" hyperlink; then follow "Locations" hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 2, 2009).
110. See Commission Press Release, IP/00/1207 (Oct. 24, 2000) (announcing the
initiation of a formal investigation).
111. See Commission Press Release, IP/02/1430 (Oct. 4, 2002) (announcing the
termination of the investigation).
112. See John M. Connor, Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International
Cartels, 6 No. 3-4J. INDUS. COMPETITION & TRADE 195, 213 (2006).
113. John M. Connor, Latin America, supra note 55, at 320-21.
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seventeen percent, as some scholars believe, then ex ante
deterrence is far below the optimum. 114 Nonetheless, individual
criminal sanctions imposed by the United States, 1 5 especially
imprisonment, might serve to reduce these shortcomings if they
create a sufficient deterrent relative to the cartel's worldwide
profits. U.S. criminal enforcement against individuals can thus be
16
regarded, to some extent, as enforcement for the world.
Large countries might also choose to not spend resources
on anticompetitive conduct that has limited or positive effects on
their jurisdictions but significant harmful effects elsewhere (type
three cases). As a result, large countries, taking into account only
their own interests, might create negative externalities on other
countries, for example by tolerating its own export cartels or by
imposing a remedy which creates such externalities.
Furthermore, conduct prohibited by a large country may, in
fact, have positive effects on the small or developing country
(type four cases). Finally, a non-cooperative exercise of
extraterritorial powers leads to an inefficiently strict policy
outcome, even in type two cases. 117 Free riding on the
enforcement actions of large jurisdictions therefore generates
sub-optimal effects.
Finally, the low maturity level of antitrust enforcement in
many developing countries also affects their ability to enjoy the
positive externalities generated by decisions from other
jurisdictions. The French/West African Shipowners' Committees case
serves as a good example." 8 In that case, the European
Commission initiated an investigation against cartels and liner
conferences with dominant positions in the maritime traffic
between Europe and several African states. In its decision, which
had pro-competitive effects on all countries concerned, the
114. See, e.g. id.; see also Connor & Helmers, supra note 8, at 89.
115. See Connor, Appraisal & Proposals, supra note 57, at 7-9. A handful of other
jurisdictions also impose criminal sanctions in cartel cases, including the United
Kingdom, Ireland, South Korea and Israel. However, the United Kingdom is the only
jurisdiction yet to impose these sanctions against a member of an international cartel.
116. Id. at 48-53. This form of deterrence is limited by the fact that some
jurisdictions decline extradition requests of their citizens by the United States for
purposes of imprisonment, due to differing views of the social severity of anticompetitive
conduct.
117. SeeTay & Willmann, supra note 11, at 320.
118. Commission Decision No. 92/262/EEC, 1992 OJ. L 134/1 (French-West
African Shipowners' Committees).
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commission indicated that it was ready to enter into talks with the
authorities of these countries with a view to helping their carriers
secure a greater share of the traffic generated by their external
trade. 9 However, the shipping authorities of the relevant
African countries instead authorized the cargo reservations by
their shipping companies. This case is interesting for another
reason as well: the European decision prohibited only the part of
the cartel that affected trade between Europe and Africa. The
European Commission declined to prohibit the additional parts
of the cartel that affected trade exclusively between African
countries, despite attempts by international bodies such as the
UNCTAD to do so and thus assist those African countries in their
attempts to prevent restrictive cartels. This is a direct result of the
unilateral enforcement norms that currently dominate antitrust:
the commission argued that prohibiting the parts of the cartel
that did not affect its own citizens was outside the scope of its
authority.
As this Part clearly indicates, small and developing countries
currently are very limited in their ability to prevent
anticompetitive conduct by foreign firms. The large proportion
of imported products that are traded in these countries implies
that the anticompetitive conduct of foreign importers will have a
strong negative effect on them without significant offsetting
benefit. Yet, current solutions in the form of either self-help,
reliance on the enforcement actions of large economies, or
joining forces with other small or developing jurisdictions, are
ineffective at solving their international antitrust enforcement
problems, although the latter might hold some future promise.
Analysis of the causes of low enforcement indicate that the
enforcement challenges of small jurisdictions are unlikely to
disappear with time, whereas those of developing jurisdictions
can disappear if their level of development significantly increases.
These current enforcement patterns generally have negative
implications for total welfare. As noted, low enforcement levels

119. See Third United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive
Business Practices, Geneva, Switz., Nov. 13-21, 1995, Restrictive Business Practices that have
an Effect in More Than One Country, In ParticularDeveloping and Other Countries, With
Overall Conclusions Regarding the Issues Raised by These Cases, U.N. Doc.
TD/RBP/CONF.4/6 (Sept. 4, 1995).
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against international cartels and abuse by international firms that
affect many jurisdictions in the same way, create underdeterrence. At the same time, merger notification proceduresespecially when they are not used as a basis for remedying the
effects of the merger on the jurisdiction-create over-deterrence.
The following section seeks to explore the implications of these
conclusions for international cooperative efforts on antitrust.
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
EFFORTS
The past decade has seen an upsurge in attempts to reach
international cooperative solutions. This part explores whether
these efforts provide a possible solution to the enforcement
problems faced by small and developing jurisdictions. As argued
below, the analysis of enforcement patterns in the previous Part
has important implications for international antitrust, as it
uncovers some of the incentive structures that result from the
asymmetric levels of enforcement that were identified.
As the number of new players that affect a jurisdiction has
grown significantly, whether international firms or foreign
antitrust authorities, complex new patterns of overlap and
spillover effects begin to emerge which have brought many
jurisdictions to the realization that some form of coordination
and harmonization are required on a global level. These efforts
are largely concentrated in the ICN. 120 The ICN shares many of
the characteristics of other recent international bodies; it is a
voluntary, quasi-private association of public actors that is based
on persuasion and common agreements rather than on coercion
21
and hierarchical mechanisms of control.
Because the ICN is based on a persuasive model where the
quality of argument and analysis takes a front seat in determining

120. See Michal S. Gal, The 'Cut and Paste' of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel:
Conditions for a Successful Transplant, 9 EUR. J. OF LAW REFORM 467, 479 (2007)
[hereinafter Gal, Article 82]. As noted above, other organizations such as the OECD,
UNCTAD and the WTO also play an important role in creating voluntary or suggested
rules for international antitrust.
121. See Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing
Nature of Modern Jurisdiction,57 EMORY LJ. 1, 5 (2007). The ICN is unique in the sense
that non-governmental advisors often have effect on its deliberations and
recommendations.
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the regulatory outcome, 122 and there exists a high level of
dependence among jurisdictions, the network creates a
potentially strong platform for solving the problems of
international antitrust for all parties involved. If each jurisdiction
is dependent on the regulatory outcomes of other jurisdictions,
then they all have an incentive to reach a common agreement, in
which negative spillovers are minimized.
Yet a more in-depth analysis, which takes into account the
existing dynamics of unilateral enforcement developed in the
previous section, suggests a more qualified conclusion. Rather
than assuming that dependency aligns the relative power and the
different interests of each jurisdiction, 123 it is suggested that
diverse unilateral enforcement levels create different degrees of
dependency that, in turn, create a pattern of power which affects
the discussions. This is because large jurisdictions have a limited
motivation to consent to changes in their antitrust policy which
move them closer to the global optimum but might reduce their
jurisdiction-specific welfare. 124 Put differently, the current
patterns of enforcement do not motivate large jurisdictions to
bargain away their benefits from current patterns of power. This
does not imply that representatives of jurisdictions are motivated
solely by a simple cost-benefit analysis pertaining to their own
jurisdiction. Indeed, many operate out of other motivations, such
as the wish to assist other jurisdictions in developing their
competition laws. 25 However, fundamental motivations are
limited where there is a direct clash of important economic
interests. The following analysis elaborates on this point. It starts
with the benefits for small and developing countries that are
likely to emerge from coordination and harmonization and then
analyzes the limitations of a cooperative system to small and
developing jurisdictions and its contribution to total welfare.
122. See ICN: Home, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited
Nov. 2, 2009); see also Fox, supra note 10.
123. SeeAhdieh, supra note 121, at 24.
124. Moreover, all large jurisdictions must agree on the change. Indeed, the ICN
has largely agreed on procedural issues that generally harm no jurisdiction rather than
on changes in substantive rules. See Ariel Ezrachi, Merger Control and Cross-Border
Transactions, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN TRANS-ATLANTIC ANTITRUST 622, 627

(Phillip Marsden ed., 2006); Guzman, InternationalAntitrust, supra note 4, at 1526-27.
125. For analysis on this topic see, for example, Yochai Benkler, Law, Policy and
Cooperation, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION (E.

Balleisen & D. Moss eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2009).
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Undoubtedly, small and developing jurisdictions stand to
benefit from international cooperation and coordination. Even if
no mechanism is put forward to solve type 3 and 4 cases,
coordination efforts create general positive effects that may
reduce problems arising in type 1 cases. Harmonization might
even be more important for small and developing jurisdictions
than to large, developed ones. For small and developing
jurisdictions, harmonizing laws generally reduces the transaction
costs to importers that might otherwise find it uneconomical to
invest in learning and complying with the laws of these
jurisdictions. 126 Small economic size or a low level of
development usually implies that there are limited profits
available. Accordingly, the lower the costs of trade in these
countries-including the costs of learning and complying with
domestic antitrust laws-the higher the incentives of foreign
firms to enter these markets and make a profit. 127 Likewise,
conforming laws may reduce the export costs of domestic
firms. 128 Both effects strengthen one of the most important tools
for overcoming the limits created by a small economy or
underdevelopment: expanding the size of the market through
129
exportation and importation.
The creation of global antitrust standards can also assist
reform advocates in advancing the adoption of welfare-based
competition rules. Indeed, it is more difficult for interest groups
to advance a cohesive set of rules that significantly diverge from
the recommendations of an influential international body.
Moreover, collective promotion of welfare-based rules is
especially important for small and developing countries, where
political economy issues are prevalent due to the close
relationship between business and governmental elites. 30

126. An exception to this general understanding arises when the harmonized law is
costly to follow, such as the case where merger regulation requires the merging firms to
file numerous documents that are costly to produce. See Gal, Article 82, supra note 120.
127. Of course, foreign trade is not without its problems. For example, it exposes
vulnerable economies to the fluctuations in worldwide demand levels. See, e.g., Lino
Briguglio, Small Island Developing States and Their Economic Vulnerabilities, 23 WORLD DEV.
1615 (1995); see alsoJOHN P. ATKINS ET AL., A COMMONWEALTH VULNERABILITY INDEX
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE POSITION OF SMALL STATES (1985).

128. See supra note 120.
129. SeeGAL, supra note 5, at 40-41.
130. Id.
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Moreover, joining forces to prevent anticompetitive
worldwide cartels, mergers, and joint ventures (type 2 cases) will
benefit all jurisdictions both directly and indirectly, by creating
stronger deterrence. Cooperation can also reduce problems in
type 1 cases through reducing the pre-merger notification costs
by ensuring proper nexus requirements.
Furthermore, some of the working groups of the ICN have
focused on issues that are special to small and developing
jurisdictions. A special working group was created to study the
effectiveness of external technical assistance programs to
developing jurisdictions out of a desire to better assist those
jurisdictions in effectively applying their antitrust laws. 3 1 In
addition, the 2009 ICN meeting included a special panel on
antitrust in small economies that attempted to shed light on
some of the unique antitrust challenges faced by these
jurisdictions. 2 These actions are indicative that small and
developing jurisdictions face different antitrust challenges and
other jurisdictions wish to assist them in overcoming these
obstacles.
Yet the limited ability of small and developing jurisdictions
to tackle international antitrust issues undoubtedly affects their
bargaining position in reaching international cooperative
solutions, especially issues that clash with the interests of large
jurisdictions. As Guzman argues, voluntary cooperative efforts are
liable to generate regulatory outcomes that do not maximize
33
total welfare. 1
This is especially true with regard to current ICN
cooperation efforts. While no jurisdiction controls the agenda or
the final choice, 134 the dynamics of the organization inevitably
lead to an outcome that does not significantly change current

131. See
ICN,
The
Effectiveness
of
Technical
Assistance,
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/working-groups/
competition-policy-implementation/the-effectiveness-of-technical-assistance (last visited
Nov. 2,2009).
132. See ICN, Summary of ICN Work Product,Presented at the 8th Annual ICN Conference
22
(2009),
available at http://www.icn-zurich.org/Downloads/Materials/ICNExecutiveSummaryof ICN WorkProductjune2009-Final_090522.pdf.
133. See Guzman, International Antitrust, supra note 4, at 1528 (arguing
international agreements are greatly impacted the bargaining positions of each
country).

134. See, e.g., Sokol, supra note 4, at 106-07.
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enforcement patterns. Since agreements are voluntary, any rule
which changes the current status-quo should make all better
off.3 5 Large jurisdictions clearly would not agree to concessions
that reduce their benefits from the current situation. This
outcome is enhanced by the fact that negotiations are generally
area-by-area and even rule-by-rule, because "trading" on benefits
in different areas cannot be achieved.13 6 Moreover, large or
developed jurisdictions generally head the working groups that
prepare the recommendations because they can spare the
resources to take an active part in the ICN. Thus, there is not
always a correlation between inter-governmental coordination
and total welfare-enhancing normative policy choices.1 3 7 Indeed,
the ICN maintains the focus of each jurisdiction on its own
domestic welfare, thereby maintaining the existing patterns of
enforcement. While international cooperation efforts should not
be disparaged, I suggest a more realistic approach to their
potential.
To start, it seems that no consensus can be reached under
the current cooperative efforts on prohibiting export cartels. The
incentive of each jurisdiction to agree to export cartel regulation
depends on the balance between the revenues that domestic
firms gain in foreign markets through cartelistic conduct and the
harm that foreign export cartels create for domestic
consumers.138 Foreign antitrust enforcement levels play an
important role. For large jurisdictions, the equation tilts toward
maintaining the status quo. On one hand, many export cartels
involve their domestic firms. These cartels are not effectively
combated in many foreign states in which they trade therefore
allowing them to enjoy high profits. On the other hand, large
jurisdictions can effectively combat most export cartels that affect
their own jurisdictions. For small and developing jurisdictions,
135. At least it should make the strongest negotiators better off.
136. See Guzman, InternationalAntitrust, supra note 4, at 1545 (comparing single
topic with wide ranging negotiations).
137. For a similar conclusion see Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs:
Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal
Internationalism,57 EMORY L.J. 31, 87-88 (2007) (concluding that cooperation does not
necessarily produce "socially desirable processes or outcomes" and that such outcomes
do not have a normative aspect to social ordering).
138. See Alvin K Klevorick & Alan 0. Sykes, United States Courts and the Optimal
Deterrenceof InternationalCartels: A Welfarist Perspective on Empagran 3 J. OF COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 309, 326-31 (2007).
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the equation tilts the other way. The incentives of different
jurisdictions to create some form of an international competition
regime to regulate monopolistic practices are often similar to
139
those of export cartels.
Turning to mergers, most jurisdictions share an incentive to
reduce procedural and substantive barriers that result from overregulation by ensuring that the pre-merger notification
procedures are triggered only in jurisdictions with strong nexus
to the merger and that they are applied in a transparent, timely,
and cost effective manner. 140 Incentives are strongest in large
jurisdictions because most international mergers involve U.S. or
EU firms. Indeed, one of the most significant international
antitrust problems currently facing large jurisdictions is the cost
imposed by a multijurisdictional merger review on one of their
firms.
This does not imply, however, that large jurisdictions will
agree to the creation of a supranational reviewing authority that
will apply a global welfare test that most small and developing
jurisdictions would find agreeable. Negotiations are currently
focused on an attempt to create principles of proper nexus,
transparency, nondiscrimination and efficiency in merger review
14
that will reduce the costs of multijurisdictional process. '
This option is preferred, from the point of view of large
jurisdictions, over the creation of a supranational reviewing
authority, for two main reasons. First, as shown above, a good
number of jurisdictions have adopted merger review procedures

139. See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Law on a Global Scale: Races Up, Down and
Sideways, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION: COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVES 348, 355-56 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Gerdin eds., 2001). This does not
imply, however, that large jurisdictions do not have incentives to reach agreements with
other large jurisdictions that affect their firms. The recent decision of the European
Commission in the Microsoft case exemplifies this point. See supra text accompanying
note 75.
140. See Fox, supra note 139, at 358, 362 (noting that national competition laws are
simultaneously divergent, redundant, as well as self-serving; further, a country unlikely to
be impacted significantly by a merger can obstruct a transnational merger that "twenty
or thirty other jurisdictions" have approved). The same set of incentives might not be
shared by the few jurisdictions that use the filing fees of foreign firms as a major source
of revenue for their agency.
141. ICN, Mergers Working Group, Recommended Practicesfor Merger Notification
Procedures (2002), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/
archive061l/mnprecpractices.pdf.
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that are wide enough to catch many global mergers, 142 but not
many go beyond the pre-merger notification stage to prohibit the
merger on substantive grounds. Thus, only large jurisdictions
and a handful of others exercise de facto veto power over
international mergers.14 3 Indeed, as Tay and Willmann have
shown, powerful countries stand to lose from the institution of a
global authority, relative to a non-cooperative regime of extraterritorial enforcement, unless unrealistic side-payments are
made.144

Secondly, this form of collective action could prevent large
jurisdictions from enjoying the locational advantages they
currently enjoy. Under the current system of limited national
vision and unilateral enforcement, large jurisdictions enjoy a
significant advantage over their smaller or less developed
counterparts in attracting international firms to locate their
headquarters within their borders. The reason is that if only
national welfare considerations are taken into account in
antitrust enforcement and large jurisdictions are almost the only
enforcers of substantive antitrust rules in international cases,
there is a far greater likelihood that a merger or a joint venture
will be approved if the parties are domestic firms. Productive and
dynamic efficiencies realized by firms trading in the global system
will only count, in practice, if they serve to benefit large
jurisdictions. Consider the following case: the production
facilities of firm A and firm B are located in country X. Both
firms are major players in X (a large jurisdiction) and in Y (a
small jurisdiction). A and B wish to engage in a joint venture for
joint export. The joint venture will increase the productive
efficiency of both firms. However, it will also raise the market
power of the joint entity in Y and raise prices for consumers. Now
consider the decisions of each jurisdiction, which are based on
their national vision: the joint venture will be approved by

142. See supra text accompanying note 140; see also John J. Parisi, International
Regulation of Mergers: More Convergence, Less Conflict, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 509,
525-26 (2005).
143. The research of Head and Reis showed that merger approval does not depend
on its overall welfare effects, but rather on its effects on the jurisdictions that can veto it.
Keith Head & John Reis, International Mergers and Welfare Under a Decentralized
Competition Policy 30 CAN.J. ECON. 1104, 1121-22 (1997).
144. Tay & Willmann, supra note 11, at 323.
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country X.145 Y has a strong economic and legal justification to
prevent the export joint venture. However, it will have limited
power to veto it and will therefore most likely accommodate the
deal. While it might apply localized remedies, these will generally
be limited in scope, as elaborated above. Now assume a reverse
situation: A and B are located in country Y. Country X will
exercise its power to stop the export joint venture and terminate
the deal. A comparable analysis can be applied in a merger case.
Indeed, Boeing-McDonnell Douglas is often described as a merger
that would have come out differently if the merging parties not
U.S. firms. 146 Thus, there exists an "antitrust enforcement level
effect" that increases the motivation of international firms to
locate in large jurisdictions. Obviously, this effect should not be
overstated, because the locational choices of firms are affected by
a host of other considerations, including taxation, production
costs, the strength of property rights, and proximity to
consumers.
This power balance is reflected in the ICN's activities. In its
formative years, deliberations mainly focused on the reduction of
procedural barriers to effective merger review and on creating a
stronger basis for national competition authorities in small or
developing jurisdictions. 147 Both items have been a main concern
for large jurisdictions because poor enforcement in other
jurisdictions created access problems into markets. 148 The ICN
deliberations do not deal, however, with the issue of export
cartels
that significantly
hurt small
and
developing
jurisdictions. 149 On a related note, the ICN working group on
145. Unless, of course, it creates significant negative spillovers in country X. See
Klevorick & Sykes, supra note 138, at 327.
146. See Commission Decision 97/816/EC, 1997 OJ. L 336/16 (Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky
and Commissioners Janet D. Steiger, Roscoe B. Starek III & Christine A. Varney in the
Matter of The Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corporation (July 1, 1997),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/07/boeingsta.shtm.
147. U.S. Mission to the EU, Justice Dep't., FTC on InternationalAntitrust Initiative
(Oct.
26,
2001),
available
at
http://useu.usmission.gov/
article.asp?ID=AAA525F8-4E04-4908-A8B9-B7E02CO58AEF.
148. See INT'L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM., supra note 1, at 206. Of

course, this does not imply that small and developing jurisdictions will not benefit from
procedural rules. More efficient nexus rules might, for example, reduce the number of
mergers notified in them and thus reduce their enforcement costs.
149. See ICN, Cartels Working Group Subgroup One, Co-operation Between Competition
Agencies
In
Cartel
Investigations
(2006),
available
at
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unilateral conduct chose not to create a working group on the
subject of buyer power as a counterforce to significant market
power. The subject was opened in a special panel in the ICN
meeting in Japan, based on the host country's prerogative to
suggest a panel, but was not pursued further despite requests
from representatives from several developing jurisdictions. The
ICN, furthermore, does not offer solutions to the enforcement
problems of small and developing jurisdictions that go beyond
increased unilateral enforcement.
Moreover, some of the guidelines, while oftentimes
exhibiting a high level of economic and legal analysis, are not
geared towards the special needs of small and developing
jurisdictions. A suggestive example is the use of market shares as
indicators of market power in abuse cases. Given the high costs
involved in a full-fledged market analysis, small and developing
economies regularly use market share indicators to provide an
estimate of total market power. 150 However, the ICN working
group on unilateral conduct, which is mostly comprised of
agency representatives and non-governmental advisors from the
United States and the EU, recommended that market shares
should be given little, if any, weight. In fact, at one point
suggestions were made to recommend that they not be used at
all. 15 1 To be sure, market shares are imperfect indicators of
market power. But requiring the use of much more complicated
indicators may lead small and developing jurisdictions to bring
less cases of abuse due to the prohibitively high costs of proof.
While ICN deliberations are based on voluntary participation and

http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/
conference_5th-capetown_2006/ICN-private-enforcement-final-version.pdf.
150. See, e.g., GAL, supra note 5, at 63-68 (arguing market shares are a better
indicator of market power in small economies).
151. This suggestion was raised in the discussions between members of the working
group, in which the author took part. The final document represents a less extreme
view, as a result of resistance from several representatives of small economies. See ICN,
UnilateralConduct Working Group, Dominance/SubstantialMarket Power Analysis Pursuantto
available at
(2008),
Unilateral Conduct Laws, Recommended Practices 3-4
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral-conduct/
UnilateralWG 1.pdf. The author is a non-governmental advisor of the working group
on unilateral conduct. At the insistence of several representatives and non-governmental
advisors from small jurisdictions, it was also recognized that, although the dominance
analysis is similar, small size might affect the economic assessment of dominance.
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discursive democracy, small and developing jurisdictions are in
practice, once again, rule takers rather than rule makers.
Small and developing jurisdictions do have, however, a
strong card up their sleeve, should they join forces: their premerger notification procedures. This tool is significant not
because it is used to remedy the problems of each jurisdictionthe empirical analysis indicates that it is rarely used for such
matters-but rather because of the sheer number of small and
developing jurisdictions that already have merger notification
requirements in place. As noted, these procedures impose high
transaction costs on firms wishing to merge that operate in global
markets. Thus, small and developing jurisdictions can potentially
"trade in" this card for concessions in other antitrust fields, such
as a joint action against export cartels and abusive conduct by
international firms. 152 Indeed, the creation of a more efficacious
of large
and harmonized merger regime was a strong motivation
53
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Finally, the enforcement problems of small and developing
jurisdictions explored in this Article can also explain, at least
partially, the reluctance of developing jurisdictions to adopt an
international agreement on antitrust enforcement through the
WTO, which many find surprising. 154 One of the main
suggestions in the negotiations involved a requirement that each
country enforce its own laws to prevent cartels occurring from
within its jurisdiction that affect international trade. As Elhauge
and Geradin suggest, although discussions also involved technical
assistance to developing jurisdictions in enforcing their own laws,
they may have feared that such assistance would not actually
materialize. 55 It might well be that given the many obstacles
faced by developing jurisdictions in applying their antitrust laws
152. For a general idea of mutual payoffs see Guzman, InternationalAntitrust, supra
note 4, at 1532-38 (discussing concessions as a form of payment during negotiations).
153. ICN, History, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/
en/about-icn/history (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). It is also the area in which the most
harmonization seems to be apparent. See ICN, Report on the Implementation of the ICN
Recommended Practicesfor Merger Notification and Review Procedures 4 (2005), available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive06l1/050505MergerNPImplementationRpt.pdf ("As of April 2005, 46% of ICN Member jurisdictions with
merger laws have made or have proposed changes that bring their merger regimes into
closer conformity with Recommended Practices ...
154. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 10, at 156-57.
155. ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 20, at 1108.
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in international matters that they were concerned that they
would not be able to meet this requirement and then be
sanctioned by the WTO.
CONCLUSION
Anticompetitive conduct by private firms is becoming the
Achilles heel of international trade. It is now apparent that
antitrust should apply beyond one's borders and that some form
of international cooperation is necessary in order to tackle
current problems in the global antitrust regime. Indeed,
coordination may be an important way to restore at least some
degree of one's control over international issues. The purpose of
this Article was to inject some realism into the analysis of the
current international antitrust practice and into the steps towards
a more cooperative one.
To do so, the Article analyzed the unique enforcement
challenges faced by small and developing jurisdictions, their
causes and their impact on their ability to regulate international
antitrust issues with domestic implications, as well as their ability
to reach better solutions through cooperative channels. The
analysis demonstrates the several enforcement problems faced by
small and developing jurisdictions in applying the unilateral noncooperative and cooperative enforcement approaches that
currently dominate antitrust. The theoretical analysis was
substantiated by an empirical study of the enforcement activities
of these jurisdictions. The study clearly indicated that antitrust
laws are rarely used by small and developing jurisdictions to deal
with international antitrust problems arising within their
territories. It also indicated that the causes of current
enforcement patterns are not transitional in small jurisdictions
and are likely to plague developing ones until their level of
development significantly increases. In light of these limitations,
the conduct of small and developing jurisdictions is often
rational from their point of view, despite the fact that they often
appreciably suffer from the anticompetitive conduct of foreign
firms. In addition, this Article showed that enforcement activities
by other jurisdictions do not solve many of these enforcement
problems.
The Article also analyzed the complex economic and
political factors at work that are likely to shape attempts to
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coordinate and harmonize antitrust enforcement activities on a
global level. Current attempts to coordinate activity are motivated
by the blurring of jurisdictional lines as a result from economic
globalization and the appearance of multiple, overlapping
antitrust authorities. As the dichotomy between domestic and
international issues is constantly challenged, new international
antitrust governance mechanisms have appeared. The analysis
attempted to provide a realistic understanding of the limitations
of the current system in creating effective solutions to welfare
issues. Most importantly, it demonstrates that modern institutions
do not offer the potential for solving many of the enforcement
problems of small and developing jurisdictions due to
heterogeneous preferences and embedded power relationships
that result from different levels of extraterritorial enforcement of
antitrust laws. Although current international efforts do not serve
as a panacea to the unique challenges faced by small and
developing jurisdictions, they do hold some promise for solving
some international antitrust issues. The analysis also serves as a
possible explanation of the reluctance of developing jurisdictions
to negotiate multilateral rules on antitrust within the framework
of the WTO.
Fortunately, the most workable solutions to the enforcement
problems of small and developing jurisdictions may lie within
their reach: joining forces in order to create regional antitrust
enforcement agreements; and investing more in creating a
mature competition culture and sophisticated enforcement
agencies in developing jurisdictions. Realization of these options
and their importance for solving international antitrust
enforcement problems is thus crucial. This is an important venue
for future work.

